setts held, that such stipulation would not be broken by the use of one of the rooms for the weaving of a few pieces of material from woolen and linen thread and cotton, spun elsewhere and kept in the room. Bogell vs. People's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 9 Gray, 23.

When there is a conflict between the printed and written portions of a policy, effect is usually given to that which is written, as more surely indicating the intent of the parties; as, where the printed condition of a policy excepted losses "caused by or consequent upon" the bursting or collapsing of a steam boiler or a steam pump, but the written portion insured the steam engine, and the fire by which the insured property was destroyed was caused by an explosion of the steam boiler: it was held, that there was a repugnance between the written and printed portions of the policy, and that the written portions must prevail. Hayward vs. Northwestern Ins. Co., 19 Abb. Pr. N. Y., 116.

This rule was also applied to excuse want of notice of additional insurance as required by the printed conditions of the policy, where the insurer had written across its face, "privileged for $4,500 additional insurance." Benedict vs. Ocean Ins. Co., 31 N. Y., 389. See also, Goss vs. Citizens' Ins. Co., 18 La. An., 97.

Written description of the subject insured by a policy was as follows: "a stock of goods consisting of a general assortment of dry goods, groceries, crockery, boots and shoes, and such goods as are usually kept in a general retail store." In the printed conditions, annexed, and made part of the policy, it was stipulated, that if the premises should be used for the purpose of storing any of the goods denominated hazardous, &c., or included in the memorandum of "special hazard;" unless it should be specially provided for in the policy, or subsequently assented to by the company in writing the policy should be void. The policy contained printed classes of hazards and memoranda of "special hazards," among which latter was the following: "gunpowder, &c., are expressly prohibited from being deposited, stored or kept in any building insured, or containing any goods, &c., insured by this policy, unless by special consent in writing

on this policy." It appeared that, at the time of effecting the insurance, the assured kept in his store for sale, among other goods, a small amount of gunpowder, and that gunpowder is an article usually kept in a general retail store, in quantities ranging from ten to fifty pounds. It was held, first, that keeping an article in a store for retail purposes is not a storing or keeping within the meaning of the words of the policy; second, that the written portion of the policy should control the printed conditions when there is a repugnance between them; third, that the written words in the policy were broad enough to include all articles usually dealt in by persons keeping a general retail store, and that all such articles were as much included in the policy as if each was enumerated at length, and that the policy was valid. Phoenix Ins. Co., vs. Taylor, 5 Minn., 492. See also, Duncan vs. Sun Fire Ins. Co., 6 Wend., 488; Protection Ins. Co. vs. Harmer, 22 Ohio, 452.

One of the printed clauses in a policy of insurance stipulated, that if gunpowder should be kept upon the premises, without written consent and permission of the company, the policy should be void; and a second printed clause provided, that no greater amount than twenty-five pounds of gunpowder should at any time be placed in the building, and that such powder should be kept in tin or other metallic canisters. It was held, that the assured had a right to keep on hand in tin or metallic canisters any amount of gunpowder not exceeding twenty-five pounds; the second printed clause being a modification of the first. Bowman vs. Pacific Ins. Co., 27 Mo., 152.

In the case of the Peoria Marine and Fire Ins. Co. vs. Hall, 12 Mich., 202, it was held, that where by a fire policy the keeping of gunpowder, without written permission in the policy, was to render the policy void, knowledge, by the agent taking insurance on a stock of goods, that gunpowder was kept and to be kept, would prevent the avoidance of the policy thereby, whether such permission was endorsed thereon or not. See Fire Ass. of Philadelphia vs. Williamson, 26 Penn. St., 196; People's Ins. Co. vs. Spencer, 53 Penn. St.,

Twenty-fourth. "If, in the opinion of the company, an over insurance exists, or shall be hereafter made on the property hereby insured, or the risk be increased by any means, or if for any other cause the company shall so elect, the company reserve to themselves the right of cancelling this policy by paying to the insured the unexpired premium pro rata.”

Without such a clause, providing for cancellation, a policy cannot be cancelled by vote of the insurers and notice to the holder, unless the latter consent to the same. Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. vs. Swift, 10 Cush., 433. But where the policy concontains such a condition as is above quoted, the insurers may, for any cause, cancel the policy at their discretion. There must, however, be cancellation and notice thereof, and not a mere notice that the company desire to cancel. vs. National Protection Ins. Co., 25 Barb., 189.

Goit

After the issue of a policy, the assured put up seven additional stoves in his building, and notified the insurers thereof, admitting that it increased the risk. The insurers declined to continue the insurance, and said they would return his premium note without charge. The insured wrote again, inquiring if they would not also return the cash premium that had been paid by him, adding that if they would do so he would be satisfied and get insured elsewhere. The company replied that they would not, but would make no assessment on his note. The building was destroyed before anything further was done. This was held to be notice to the insured, that the company declined to assume the increased risk and elected to terminate their insurance, and that, thereupon, the policy was cancelled. Fabyan vs. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 33 N. H., 203.

Where a policy was issued by an agent, with provision for renewal on payment of premium to be endorsed on the policy or otherwise acknowledged by the secretary or other authorized officer of the company, and it had been several times renewed by the agent, and at the last renewal the company directed the agent to return the premium and cancel the policy, the agent notified the insured of the direction of the company, but did not return the premium for a few days

for want of funds; meantime the building was burned. It was held, that as the acts of the agent in making those renewals had been several times ratified, he must be deemed authorized to renew, and that the company must pay the loss, the cancellation not having been perfected. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. vs. Massey, 33 Penn. St., 221.

The provision for cancelling the policies of a mutual insurance company provided for seven days notice to the assured of their intention to do so, and that they should refund a ratable portion of the premium. On the evening of the thirteenth of February, after the closing of the post office, a notice directed to the plaintiff was deposited therein, stating that his policy would be cancelled on the twentieth of February, and that he would not after that date be deemed insured or liable to assessment. The notice was received on the fourteenth of February, and the property was burned on the twenty-second. In an action upon the policy it was held that the plaintiff could not recover, his policy having been cancelled, and he having received seven days notice of the intent of the company to cancel his policy on a day subsequent to the giving of the notice. Emmott vs. Slater Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 7 R. I., 562.

The directors of a mutual fire insurance company may still lay necessary assessments upon the deposit notes, after a day fixed by them for the taking effect of the cancellation of all outstanding policies, under a vote duly adopted. Fayette Mut. Fire Ins. Co., vs. Fuller, 8 Allen, 27.

Twenty-fifth. "This insurance (the risk not being changed) may be continued for such further time as may be agreed on, provided the premium therefor is paid and endorsed on this policy or a receipt given therefor; and it shall be considered as continued under the original representation: but in case there shall have been any change in the risk, either within itself or by adjacent buildings, not made known to the company by the assured at the time of renewal this policy and renewal shall be void.

Each renewal of a policy of insurance is a new contract, and is subject to the local laws in force at the time of the renewal. Brady vs. Northwestern Ins. Co., 11 Mich., 425.

Where a general agreement is made for the renewal of a policy, nothing being said about rate, the insured has a right to presume that the renewal is to be at the rate formerly paid. Post vs. Etna Ins. Co., 43 Barb., 351.

Action will lie upon a renewal receipt on which the premium has been paid, as on an express agreement of the insurance company made at that date. Peoria Marine and Fire Ins. Co. vs. Hervey, 34 Ill., 46.

Notwithstanding the insertion in the clause quoted above, that the insurance "shall be considered as continued under the original representation," any misrepresentations contained in the original application must be deemed to be waived, and the company are bound by the policy if, after having full knowledge of the risk, they choose to renew it. Miller vs. Maine Ins. Co., 49 Me., 200.

Where renewals of a policy originally issued to a party have been granted to his executors, after his decease, without inquiry or representation, the company should be held to have insured whatever interest in the property has become vested in the executors by the will and by their acts. Phelps vs. Gebhard Fire Ins. Co., 9 Bosw., 405.

In Carroll vs. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 38 Barb., 402, an insurance company which, with knowledge of the facts, had accepted from the assured the premium for renewal and issued a renewal receipt, was held to have thereby declared the contract of insurance to be valid, and to be estopped from enforcing a forfeiture on the ground of the omission of the insured to give notice of other insurance and have it endorsed on the policy.

So, where insurers have by their acts and conduct acknowledged the insurable interest of one who paid them a premium for renewal, they cannot afterwards deny his interest, in a suit to recover for a loss occurring after such renewal. New England Fire and Marine Ins. Co. vs. Wetmore, 32 Ill., 321.

In the same case it was held, that a renewal receipt does not constitute a new agreement of insurance, but merely revives and continues in force the old one, and that if a loss