ship was afterwards dissolved, and all the interest of the party, who had held the title, in the partnership assets, was transferred to his copartner, and the insurers, with knowledge of the facts, agreed that the policy should "stand good." In a subsequent action, to recover for the loss of the buildings by fire, the policy was sustained. Collins vs. Charlestown Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 10 Gray, 155. It has been held, that an insurance company is chargeable with knowledge of all the facts stated by an applicant to the agent of the insuring company; and, that if the applicant truly state to the agent the real condition of the property, he cannot be held to have made any misstatement, or practised any concealment, notwithstanding the written application should vary from such statement. Precisely how far the courts would allow the written statements of an application to be varied by evidence of such parol representations to an agent cannot be accurately stated, but wherever the circumstances were such, that it could properly be held that the misrepresentation in the written application was the result of a mistake, courts of equity will allow the application to be corrected on behalf of the insured, if it can be done without injury to other parties interested. See Kibbe vs. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Gray, 163. That parol proof is inadmissible, to prove that the true state of the title was known to the agent, was held, when the policy contained a provision, that every such agent is the agent of the applicant and not of the company. Abbott vs. Shawmut Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 3 Allen, 213. In Merrill vs. Farmers' & Mechanics' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 48 Maine, 285, it was held, that where a policy is rendered void by a misrepresentation of title in the application, a subsequent assignment with the consent of the company would not give it validity. Probably, if it should be shown that the company, at the time of consenting to the assignment, had full knowledge of all the real facts, it would be held a waiver of the forfeiture, or a new agreement with the assignee. A father permitted his son to use his name in buying and selling goods; and, while the goods were really wholly owned by the son, the business was done in the name of both. This was held not so to affect the legal rights and interests of the parties, as to render void a policy of insurance issued on the goods in the name of the son. Gould vs. York Co. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 47 Maine, 403. The effect of failure to disclose the true title, as to one of several parcels of property, insured by the same policy but each separately valued, was held to be the avoidance of the policy as to all, in Day vs. Charter Oak Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 51 Maine, 91. That property held as collateral security was held "in trust," and must be so represented in a policy containing the condition cited in the text, was held in the same case. A statement of a less amount than is due upon a mortgage which is disclosed as an incumbrance, in answer to a question in the application, will avoid a policy. Fales vs. Conway Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 7 Allen, 46. One who had made, but not delivered, a bill of sale of personal property, taking in return a note secured by mortgage thereon, represented himself in an application for insurance to be the owner thereof. The policy issued thereon was held good. Vogel vs. People's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 9 Gray, 23. See also Nichols vs. Fayette Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 1 Allen, 63; Wyman vs. People's Equity Ins. Co., ib., 301. Twenty-second. "Or if the premium be unpaid.” Twenty-third. "Or if the assured shall keep gunpowder or phosphorus, or keep and use camphene, spirit gas, or chemical oils, without written permission in this policy, then, &c., this policy shall be void." The insurer has, of course, a right to stipulate for the exclusion of such articles as he may deem unusually hazardous, and if must be substantially complied with; but such a stipulation broken by a mere temporary deposit of the articles is not prohibited. Hynds vs. Schenectady County Mutual Insurance Co., 1 Kernan, 554. Nor would the temporary introduction of hazardous articles, for the purpose of repairs, be a breach of a condition which prohibits trading in or storing such articles; the object of the prohibition being held to be, simply to prevent the building from being habitually used for the prohibited trade or purpose, and the habitual deposit in store of the prohibited articles, and not their occasional introduction for the purpose of repairs and painting. O'Neill vs. The Buffalo F. Ins. Co., 3 Comstock, 122. So, where a tar barrel was introduced, and from it the building caught fire: it was held, that the stipulation referred to the habitual and ordinary use and deposit, and not to the occasional introduction of either. Dobson v8. Sotheby, M. & M., 90; (22 English Common Law, 481). The keeping of "liquors" in a boarding house, for the accommodation of the boarders, has been held not to be a violation of a condition prohibiting the "storing of extra hazardous articles," among which are included "spirituous liquors." Rafferty vs. New Brunswick Fire Insurance Co., 3 Harrison, N. J., 480. In Connecticut, under a policy which provided that, “ if the building should be appropriated, applied or used, to or for the purpose of keeping or storing therein extra hazardous articles, then, and so long as the building should be so used, the policy should cease and be of no further effect ;" the building having been, while the policy was in existence, appropriated to the uses prohibited, but not being so used at the time of the fire; it was held, that the company was bound to pay. Lounsbury vs. Pro. Ins. Co., 8 Ct., 459. In Maine, under a policy in which "cotton in bales" was named as belonging to the class of extra hazardous articles, it was held, that a policy would not be avoided by the fact that a part of the stock consisted of "cotton in bales," unless, in fact, the risk was thereby increased; and that this was properly a question for a jury. Moore vs. Protection Ins. Co., 29 Maine, 97. This decision rests upon the ground that the provision excluding such extra hazardous articles was intended merely, to prevent the appropriation of the building to the storing or keeping such articles, and not to dealing in them in the ordinary course of trade of the assured. But, in the same State and by the same court, under a policy on "stock in trade, consisting of merchandise not hazardous," where it appeared that "oil, tallow and glass," which were among the articles designated extra hazardous, were kept with the stock insured, the policy was held to be void. Richards vs. Protection Ins. Co., 30 Maine, 273. The principle established in the case Moore vs. Pro. Ins. Co., is sustained by the cases above referred to, of O'Neill vs. Buffalo Fire Ins. Co., 3 Comstock, 122, Hynds vs. Schen. County Mut. Insurance Co., 1 Kernan, 554, and also by the cases Leggett vs. Etna Insurance Co., 10 Rich. Law, 202, Mayor, &c., of New York vs. Hamilton Insurance Company, 10 Bosworth, (Superior Court of N. Y. City), 537. In Kentucky, under a policy which prohibited the keeping or storing of enumerated articles, and provided that the policy should be suspended while they should be so kept, it was held, that the policy was not rendered void by the occasional keeping of such articles on the insured premises. Phoenix Insurance Company vs. Taylor, 4 Metcalf, Ky., 9. Where the keeping of benzole was confined by the stipulations of the policy to a detached shed, the fact that the insured in carrying on their business used it, as needed in the factory, from an open can in the usual way, is not a breach of the stipulation; benzole being ordinarily used in that way, and the insurers, having knowledge that it was used by the insured in their business, must be presumed to have intended that it might be used as it is ordinarily in similar manufactories. Citizens' Ins. Company vs. McLaughlin, 53 Pennsylvania State, 485. The prohibition of "storing or keeping" articles in a building is not violated by the use of articles as means and instruments of a public exhibition. Mayor and Corporation of New York vs. Hamilton Ins. Co., 10 Bosworth, (Superior Court, N. Y. City), 537. It appeared that "rags" had been kept as part of a stock in trade, described in the application for a policy of insurance (which application was made a part of the policy and a warranty on the part of the assured) as consisting of "dry goods, groceries, hardware, crockery, glass and wooden ware, britannia and tin ware, stoves of various kinds, and various other wares and merchandise." Conditions were annexed and referred to, as forming part of the policy, and as "to be used and resorted to in explanations of the rights and obligations of the parties in all cases not specially provided for ;" one of the conditions was, "that if the premises be used for the purposes of storing or keeping therein any of the articles denominated hazardous, &c., the policy shall be void." "Rags" were among the articles thus denominated hazardous, and it was held that the keeping of them avoided the policy, and that to allow proof of a usage to keep rags in such country stores would control the written agreement of the parties by parol evidence, and was therefore incompetent. Macomber vs. Howard Fire Ins. Co., 7 Gray, 257. Compare with Moore vs. Protection Ins. Co., 29 Me., 97, cited above. In Whitmarsh vs. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 2 Allen, 581, it was held that a policy was made void, which contained a stipulation similar to that in Macomber's case, by the keeping for sale upon the premises articles mentioned as hazardous, and that the fact that the property was insured as a provision and grocery store" did not warrant the keeping of such articles as part of the stock pertaining to such busi ness. Machinery in a silk factory was insured, under a policy which contained a stipulation that it should be of no effect while the premises should be used for storing "cotton in bales," "rags," or "wool," or for a "cotton mill," "woolen mill," or other manufacturing establishment or trade requiring the use of heat. The supreme court of Massachu |