During the riots, which occurred in London in June of that year, the mob, among other acts of violence and destruction, burned down the house of one Langdale, which was insured in the Sun Fire Office, and action was brought to recover for the loss. The special matter under consideration was, the meaning of the words "civil commotion." Lord Mansfield said, "I think a civil commotion' is this: an insurrection of the people for general purposes, though it may not amount to a rebellion, where there is a usurped power. If you think this was an insurrection of the people for the purposes of mischief, though not amounting to a rebellion, you will find for the defendants." The question here, as will be seen, was with proper instructions left to the jury, who upon those instructions found a verdict for the defendants. The word, "riot," has since been added, which is quite different in meaning from, and much narrower than, "insurrection," or civil commotion; being commonly defined to be, a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more persons, assembling of their own will, with intent mutually to assist each other against any who may oppose them, in the execution of some enterprise of a private nature, and afterwards actually executing, or attempting to execute, the same in a violent and turbulent manner, to the terror of the people; whether the act intended were, of itself, lawful or unlawful. The difference between a mob or riot," and a 66 civil commotion" or "rebellion," as a crime, is such, that the one is a mere breach of the peace, with greater or less aggravation, and perhaps involving, incidentally, other crimes and misdemeanors; while the other is treason, and includes all other crimes committed in effecting its guilty purpose. A question arose in Louisiana, in an action on a fire policy which contained the clause, "this corporation shall not be liable to make good any loss by fire, which may happen or take place by means of any invasion, insurrection, riot or civil commotion, or of any military or usurped power." The building insured was destroyed by a fire purposely set by rioters, and it was held, that the insurer was not liable for the loss; and that it was immaterial, whether the rioters assembled originally for a riotous purpose, but afterwards were guilty of a riot. It was claimed by the insured, that the fact that there was a riot should be established by the judgment of a competent court, in a proper criminal proceeding, in which the rioters should be tried and convicted; but the court held that no case had been cited, and it was not aware that any existed, which would support that position. Dupin vs. Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Rob. (La.) R., 482. The meaning of the words, " usurped power," was drawn in question and discussed in the case, "City Fire Ins. Co. vs. Corlies, 21 Wend., (N. Y.), R., 367. This case arose out of a loss at the time of the great fire, which occurred at the city of New York on the morning of the 17th of December 1835. A store was blown up with gunpowder, by order of the mayor of the city, and the goods therein were entirely destroyed. It was claimed that, though the mayor had no authority to do the act, yet, as he acted under color of his official position, it was a case happening by means of "usurped power," which in the policy was expressly excepted. That there was an excess of jurisdiction by a lawful magistrate, was admitted; and the question made was, whether this was the exercise of an usurped power, within the meaning of the exception. Judge Bronson, in delivering the opinion of the court, said, "that is not what the insurers had in mind, when they made the exception." "Whether the mayor had the concurrence of two aldermen, as the statute provides, or not, there can be no doubt of his common law power, as the chief magistrate of the city, to destroy buildings in a case of necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire. "Indeed, the same thing may be done by any magistrate, or even by a citizen without official authority." Mayor of N. Y. vs. Lord, 17 Wend., 285. The question of, what acts of destruction were within this exception, has arisen in numerous cases in this country, out of events connected with or arising out of the late rebellion and civil war. In some cases, a town was destroyed, or many of its valuable buildings with their contents burned, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the opposing force, by the express order of the civil magistrate. I am not aware that the question, whether such a destruction would be within the exception, has been authoritatively decided. Twelfth. "Nor for the loss of bills, notes, accounts, deeds, evidences of debt, or securities of property of any kind, money, bullion, jewels, plate, watches, musical or scientific instruments, ornaments, medals, patterns, printed music, engravings, paintings, picture frames, sculpture, casts, models, or curiosities, unless particularly specified in the policy." The questions arising under this exception have usually been of the meaning and construction of the terms used for example, where the exception was of "jewels, plate, medals or other curiosities, paintings and sculpture," and among the items of household furniture, for the loss of which the assured claimed, were included five portraits with their frames, twelve silver table-spoons, twelve tea-spoons, and silver sugar tongs, the court instructed the jury that although “plate and paintings" were not covered by the policy unless specified, yet he doubted whether the condition could be applied to the portraits or silver spoons, specified in the schedule of this insured. The expression, " or other curiosities," would seem to indicate that the insurers had in mind articles of · ornament, as contradistinguished from those designed for common use or kept as memorials of friends. Moadinger vs. Mechanics' Fire Ins. Co., 2 Hall, (N. Y.), 490. In an early case, upon a policy issued to a coach-plater and cow keeper on "his stock in trade, household furniture, linen, wearing apparel and plate," where it appeared that the fire consumed, among other things, a large stock of linendrapery goods: it was held, that upon a true construction of the whole description of goods intended to be insured, the policy referred to household linen and apparel, and did not cover the stock of linen goods. Watchford vs. Langford, 3 Camp. N. P., 422. A policy on "wearing apparel, furniture, and stock of a grocery," will not cover "linen and sheets," smuggled and secretly kept for sale. A "watch," being an article included in this memorandum, is not embraced in a policy which merely names "furniture and wearing apparel." Clary vs. Protection Ins. Co., Wright, (Ohio), 227. A clause in a policy covering "jewelry and clothing," being stock in trade, does not include musical instruments, surgical instruments, guns, pistols, or books. Rafael vs. Nashville Marine and Fire Ins. Co., 7 La. An., 244. But the addition of a general term, or the character, "&c.," will include all things of the same or similar kind and nature. As, where the description was, "on their stock of watches, watch trimmings, fc.," it was held to include the entire stock of the insured, consisting of "plate, silver ware, tools of trade, and such other goods as form part of similar stocks in Boston; all being covered by the "fc."; which was once defined by Lord Coke as meaning, "whatever else ought to have been expressed." Crosby vs. Franklin Ins. Co., 5 Gray, (Mass.), 504. Any word or expression used will, ordinarily, be liberally construed, as including whatever is necessary to fill up its fullest and most perfect meaning; as, where a "steam sawmill" is insured, the policy covers under that designation all the machinery necessary to make it a steam saw-mill, in all its parts. Bigler vs. New York Central Ins. Co., 20 Barb., (N. Y.), 635. So, the expression, "starch manufactory," in a description in an insurance policy, will include fixtures and machinery necessary to its operation. Peoria Marine & Fire Ins. Co. vs. Lewis, 18 Ill., 553. So, an insurance of a "Bathing establishment" would include, not only the building and its fixtures, but possibly all its bowls, towels and other articles, used in the process of bathing. It will be seen, that it is important that careful attention be given, on the part of the parties to an insurance policy, to a proper designation of every thing which it is intended to cover. Especially is this important to the party insured, who will frequently find that he is unprotected as to some articles, which he would have named if he had given proper attention. to the policy at the time it was made. But parties insured are notoriously careless and negligent in the matter of their insurance contracts, frequently examining them, for the first time, after the property is destroyed, and then often finding that, through negligence and inattention, they have failed to include important and valuable property, which they had intended to protect, and have been in the constant violation of conditions, which were plainly printed or written out for their guidance, and which could have been easily observed, if they had taken the pains to inform themselves what they were. Insured parties are sometimes disposed to blame, quite unreasonably, companies who act honorably and faithfully up to the fullest and most liberal construction of the contract, in favor of the insured, for losses occasioned simply and alone by their own carelessness. They even sometimes blame the courts, for a decision which the plain terms of the contract imperatively calls for, when they learn at great expense the plain and simple lesson, that courts, and even courts of equity, cannot make a contract for the parties, nor fritter away or ignore its plain provisions, nor give equitable relief against the party's own carelessness and inattention. If this book shall induce any considerable number of business men, careful and prudent in other respects, to bestow proper attention upon the provisions contained in the policies of insurance and the leases executed or accepted by them, I shall feel that it has accomplished a most useful purpose. Thirteenth. "Nor from fires in buildings unprovided with good, substantial stone or brick chimneys." Such a general condition as this, and which imposes a bur den on the insured, will be construed strictly against the insurer, so that such a condition would probably be held to |