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THE PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY CAMPAIGN, MR. ROOSEVELT ADDRESSING A NEW JERSEY AUDIENCE

sulted in the obtaining of solid Taft dele- Taft forces made even more effort to carry gations from such States.

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the primaries than was made by the supporters of Mr. Roosevelt. President Taft virtually put the Presidency out of commission for many weeks, while he toured these States in person and added his appeals and arguments to the efforts of the party organizations that were controlled in his interests. He had expected to carry Pennsylvania, but lost it by a vote so overwhelming as to leave little doubt about the views of the Eastern Republicans. The verdict of Illinois was the same. California and the Pacific Coast stood

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PRESIDENT TAFT DEFENDING HIS ADMINISTRATION IN THE NEW JERSEY PRIMARY CAMPAIGN But Mr. Taft, even against the cision. Mr. Roosevelt had not spoken in The Climax changed views of his own prin- Mr. Taft's home city of Cincinnati, or that in Ohio cipal supporters, believed that immediate region. The President, in consethere might be some moral excuse for his quence, was allowed to obtain the six delecontinuance as a candidate if he could carry gates from the southwestern corner of Ohio, his own State of Ohio. No resources were and he secured two from another district in overlooked or neglected in his behalf. He the State. All the rest of Ohio's forty-two spoke in practically every county of the State, district delegates were won by Colonel and at many places in some of the counties. Roosevelt, with a large aggregate majority. He had given it to be understood that he Thus Mr. Taft's defeat in his home State was would accept as conclusive the verdict of his crushing, and its discouraging effect upon his own State. After days of intense personal supporters was evident in all directions. campaigning by both candidates, the Re- They considered that his candidacy was no

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THE PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY CAMPAIGN, MR. ROOSEVELT ADDRESSING A NEW JERSEY AUDIENCE

sulted in the obtaining of solid Taft dele- Taft forces made even more effort to carry gations from such States.

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the primaries than was made by the supporters of Mr. Roosevelt. President Taft virtually put the Presidency out of commission for many weeks, while he toured these States in person and added his appeals and arguments to the efforts of the party organizations that were controlled in his interests. He had expected to carry Pennsylvania, but lost it by a vote so overwhelming as to leave little doubt about the views of the Eastern Republicans. The verdict of Illinois was the same. California and the Pacific Coast stood

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PRESIDENT TAFT DEFENDING HIS ADMINISTRATION IN THE NEW JERSEY PRIMARY CAMPAIGN

But Mr. Taft, even against the cision. Mr. Roosevelt had not spoken in The Climax changed views of his own prin- Mr. Taft's home city of Cincinnati, or that in Ohio cipal supporters, believed that immediate region. The President, in consethere might be some moral excuse for his quence, was allowed to obtain the six delecontinuance as a candidate if he could carry gates from the southwestern corner of Ohio, his own State of Ohio. No resources were and he secured two from another district in overlooked or neglected in his behalf. He spoke in practically every county of the State, and at many places in some of the counties. He had given it to be understood that he would accept as conclusive the verdict of his own State. After days of intense personal campaigning by both candidates, the Re

the State. All the rest of Ohio's forty-two district delegates were won by Colonel Roosevelt, with a large aggregate majority. Thus Mr. Taft's defeat in his home State was crushing, and its discouraging effect upon his supporters was evident in all directions. They considered that his candidacy was no

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ing attempt to capture a national convention by sheer command of any methods or resources that could be invoked. His word was "obtuseness." The history of the Taft methods in Michigan, where a special session of the Legislature provided a primary law, affords an illustration that is fairly typical. The sole object of calling a special session and passing a Presidential preference primary law. was to put it into use this year. One word from Mr. Taft would have allowed the Michigan voters to express their preference. It took a two-thirds vote of the Legislature to give the bill immediate effect. More than two-thirds so voted in one House, and much more than a majority in the other House. One or two votes additional would have allowed Michigan to use its new primary law, which had been passed for no possible reason except that it might be used. Mr. Taft was not willing to allow any of his adherents in the Legislature to cast the one or two votes that would have subjected his candidacy to the The President himself, however, fair test of public opinion. So Michigan was could not give up. His determin- put in the silly position of having incurred the Popular Verdict ation to be renominated at what- expense of an extra session of the Legislature ever hazard to the party had apparently to pass a Presidential primary act early in become a sort of obsession. He cheerfully the year 1912 that will have practical effect announced that he would have at least a few in the year 1916.

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THE RECALL

From the Times (Washington)

standpoint of those who were honestly looking forward to a Republican victory in November.

Flouting

the

Offending the Public Conscience

The Republican voters of Michigan were as overwhelmingly opposed to Mr. Taft as were those of Wisconsin, or Illinois. But by preventing the Michigan voters from acting directly,

delegates from Ohio, and that he was sure to
obtain the six delegates-at-large that would
be selected by Ohio's State convention on
the third day of June. It was true that Mr.
Roosevelt had carried almost every county Ohio,
in the State, and had carried the State at
large by a majority of over 30,000. A State
convention, therefore, which should give Mr.
Taft the six delegates-at-large would not only
act against the expressed wishes of the party,
but would be guilty of a sort of flagrancy of
defiant misrepresentation that few public men
would care to profit by. The Taft forces were
in control of the "hold-over" organization
machinery long enough to give them the ad-
vantage in the State convention; and they
actually succeeded in obtaining for Mr. Taft
the six delegates-at-large by a close shave.
This result, of course, was due to a defect in the
primary-election law; and Mr. Taft's winning
these six delegates was purely by technical
methods in politics that simply added one
more count to the already long list of steps
and proceedings in discredit of his candidacy.

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WILL HE HAVE TO TAKE THEM?
From the Dispatch (Columbus)

"Obtuseness" One of Mr. Taft's most distin- a part of the delegation was secured for Taft in an Acute guished and unfailing advisers by methods of a kind that the direct-primary Period made use (in private) of the word movement is intended to destroy forever in that must have occurred to many men who our political life. Through the whole of this

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