ican continent which is inhabited by a people not of the Anglo-Saxon race or lineage. All concede, or if they do not concede they are at least well aware, that if the policy of territorial expansion is further pursued we may acquire a sovereignty over people who are not fitted by experience or descent for the enjoyment of all the political rights secured to citizens of the United States by the federal Constitution. Those who favor the policy of territorial expansion are for this reason naturally anxious to formulate some view of the federal Constitution that will enable them to withhold for a time from the inhabitants of such territory as we have or may hereafter acquire certain constitutional rights which they are supposed to be unfitted at the present time to enjoy, while those who are opposed to the policy of expansion very naturally insist, as a reason why it should not be pursued, that, if pursued, all constitutional rights and privileges now granted to the citizens of the states must of necessity follow the flag and be transported to a soil not adapted to their growth and development. We must leave this question of national policy which has given rise to these conflicting views concerning the application of the federal Constitution to the territories, to be settled by the legislative department of the government, where it of right belongs.

When the question of national policy is finally determined, and it is to be hoped that it will be settled in a manner consistent with the honor and permanent welfare of the American people, the perplexing legal questions which have lately arisen concerning the interpretation of the Constitution and its applicability to the territories, will cease to retain their present interest and will become of an academic character.

No such constitutional questions as those last mentioned, which now agitate the public mind, appear to have been raised in connection with the purchase of the Louisiana territory, or if raised, they do not seem to have become a subject for judicial discussion and decision, although the purchase afforded abundant opportunity for their discussion, had the lawyers and

statesmen of that day been so inclined. The first act of Congress that was passed in relation to the Louisiana territory conferred on the President of the United States as extensive authority over the territory as had ever been exercised by the king of Spain. The act provided in broad terms that "all military, civil and judicial powers exercised by the officers of the existing government of the (territory) shall be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct." (2 St. 245.) This act remained in force only one year, when it was superseded by an act which divided the Louisiana purchase into two territories, the one termed the Territory of Orleans, now the State of Louisiana, and the other the District of Louisiana. (2 St. 283.) As might have been anticipated, the latter act deprived the President of very much of the arbitrary power that had been conferred upon him by the earlier enactment. It created courts at convenient points in both territories, to be presided over by persons learned in the law, for the administration of justice according to American methods. It established the right of trial by jury both in civil and criminal cases. It declared that all free male white persons who were housekeepers and had resided in the territory one year should be qualified to serve as grand or petit jurors in the courts of the territory; that the inhabitants of the territory should be entitled to the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; that all offenses should be bailable except capital offenses where the proof was evident or the presumption great and that no cruel or unusual punishments should be inflicted. As respects the Territory of Orleans, it vested the legislative power in a governor to be appointed by the President and in thirteen of the most fit and discreet persons in the territory, who were to be appointed annually by the President from among those holding real estate therein, and who had resided in the territory at least one year, and who held no office of profit, under the territory or the United States; while the legislative power for the District of Louisiana was vested in the governor and judges of the

Indiana Territory, to which territory the District of Louisiana was temporarily attached for all governmental and legislative purposes. Although the statute vested all legislative power throughout the Louisiana purchase in appointees of the President and denied to the people the right to enact laws, yet in the Territory of Orleans, where the population was comparatively dense, this right was denied for only fifteen months. At the end of that period the people of that territory were permitted to frame laws adapted to their wants, through a legislature of their own selection. (2 St. 322.) Moreover, while the legislative power was so withdrawn from the people and vested in appointees of the President, the statute by which it was withdrawn contained the provision, in substance, that no law enacted by such appointees of the executive should be inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States or place any person under any restraint, burden or disability on account of his religious opinions, and that all laws which might be enacted should be reported to the President of the United States and laid before Congress, and if disapproved by that body should thenceforth have no force and effect. (2 St. 284.) In that part of the purchase designated as the District of Louisiana, legislative power was withheld from the people and vested in appointees of the executive until June 4, 1812. (2 St. 743.) This region, first termed the District of Louisiana, later the Territory of Louisiana (2 St. 331), and still later the Territory of Missouri (2 St. 743), out of which fourteen states and parts of states have since been carved, was of such vast extent and so sparsely settled, up to the year 1812, that a legislature could not well be elected by a popular vote or convened at any place within the territory which was convenient of access. The inhabitants of the territory seem to have recognized this fact and to have been content with the situation or too busy with their private affairs to desire to engage in the work of legislation, since no complaint was made because the legislative and executive powers were vested in the same

hands. In all probability the establishment of courts for the administration of justice, the safeguards that had been provided against the exercise of arbitrary power in the original act for the government of the Louisiana purchase, the provision found in that act that no law should be enacted imposing a disability upon anyone on account of his religious opinions, or that was in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and the provision reserving to Congress the power to annul any law that might be passed, all of which provisions remained in force, were regarded as affording adequate protection, for the time being, to life, liberty and property. The act containing these provisions, which was passed as early as March 26, 1804 (2 St. 283), certainly gave to a large population then residing within the limits of the Louisiana purchase, particularly in the Territory of Orleans, an amount of liberty and a measure of protection against arbitrary rule such as they had never before enjoyed and in all probability could not have obtained, save by revolution, had they remained subjects of a foreign power. It was a legislative measure which was intended to fulfil, as far as could be done, the obligation that had been assumed by the United States in its treaty with France (an obligation which the great Napoleon had insisted should be assumed), that the inhabitants. of the ceded territory should be admitted, as soon as possible, to the "enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States." From and after the year 1812, the inhabitants of the Louisiana purchase were granted practically the same rights of self-government and the same guaranties against the exercise of arbitrary power as were enjoyed at the time by other citizens of the United States, and these rights they continued to enjoy until the territory was divided into states and incorporated into the federal union on a full equality with other states. The Territory of Orleans was admitted into the federal union under the name of the State of Louisiana on April 8, 1812. (2 St. 701.) Two months later (on June 4, 1812) a territorial government was created

for the residue of the purchase under the name of the Territory of Missouri. (2 St. 743.) The act creating a government for the Territory of Missouri was the model in general accordance with which all subsequent acts were drawn for the government of the several territories that were afterward carved out of the Louisiana purchase. That act vested the executive power in a governor to be appointed by the President of the United States, the judicial power in a superior court consisting of three judges, also to be appointed by the President, and in inferior courts and justices of the peace, while the legislative power was vested in a general assembly consisting of the governor, a legislative council of nine members and a house of representatives, the latter to be elected by the people. The general assembly was authorized "to make laws in all cases, both civil and criminal, for the good government of the people of said territory, not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." It was given power to establish inferior courts and to prescribe their jurisdiction and duties "; also, to define the powers and duties of justices of the peace and other civil officers in the territory, to regulate and fix the fees of office and to ascertain and provide for the payment of the same. The governor of the territory was enjoined by the act to see that all laws were faithfully executed and was given the power to grant pardons for offenses against the territory and to veto such acts of the general assembly as did not meet with his approval. The act further provided that all free male white persons of the age of twenty-one years who had resided one year in the territory should have the right to vote not only for members of the general assembly, but for a delegate to represent the people in the Congress of the United States, and that they should be qualified to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States or under said territory, and that they should likewise be qualified to serve as grand or petit jurors in the courts of the territory. The act further declared that the people should always be entitled to a proportionate representa