perty, is a satisfaction of the judgment. Cass v. Adams, 3 Ohio Rep. 224.

1. Where seamen ship for a particular voyage, and the vessel deviates from such voyage, with the consent and privity of the owners, but contrary to the wishes of the seamen, for the purpose of engaging in an illicit trade, and by reason thereof the seamen are seized and imprisoned in a foreign country, they are entitled to full wages from the time of their shipping on the voyage, to the time of their return to the United States, deducting their advance wages and whatever they have earned (if any) in any intermediate employment. Shepard v. Taylor, 5 Pet. 711.

2. Seamen have a lien for their wages, where restitution in value is made for a vessel, in the same manner, as if it had been specifically restored, and may pursue the proceeds, wherever they can trace them. lb.

3. Certain seamen in August, 1806, shipped on board of a vessel for a voyage from Baltimore to the Northwest coast, thence to Canton, and thence back again to Baltimore, and the vessel with the consent and privity of the owners, but contrary to the wish of the seamen, deviated from such voyage, and proceeded to Conception Bay, on the coast of Chili, for the purpose of carrying on an illicit trade there, where she was seized and condemned by the Spanish authorities, and the crew were imprisoned for a great length of time; and afterwards the crew effected their escape and arrived in the United States in December, 1810, when they immediately filed a libel against the owners. Some testimony was taken, but no further proceedings were had till October 1818, when an amended libel, with the additional allegation, that the owners had received the whole or a part of the proceeds of the cargo, was filed-in 1819 the owners, who owned the cargo also, failed, and assigned all their interest in the proceeds of ship and cargo to different persons to secure debts antecedently due. Before these assignments, in June 1815, the owners obtained an order from the King of Spain for the restitution of ship and cargo, but no restitution having been made, the assignees laid their claim before the commissioners under the Florida treaty, by whom compensation was awarded in 1824 for ship, freight, and cargo, separately, which was subsequently received by the assignees — in 1825 the libellants filed a new libel against the owners and their

assignees, alleging the award and receipt of the money by the assignees it was held,

First, That the seamen were entitled to full wages from the time of their shipping on the voyage to the time of their return to the United States, deducting their advance wages and whatever they had earned (if any) in any intermediate employment. Secondly, That they had a lien upon the proceeds of the ship, in the hands of the assignees, for their wages.

Thirdly, That in this case, they had also aclaim upon the freightmoney in the hands of the assignees, the assignments having been taken as mere securities for antecedent debts, and there being constructive notice, in the facts of the case, of the claims of the seamen, at the time of the assignments.

SEIZIN.

A patent of unimproved lands, no part of which was in the possession of any one at the time it issued, gives legal seizin and constructive possession of all the land within the survey. Peyton v. Steth, 5 Pet. 487.

SET-OFF.

Where credit has been obtained upon an agreement to pay and take up certain notes, as they become due, the notes are not taken up, and suit is brought upon the credit; the liability on the agreement cannot be used as a set-off. Colvin v. Carter, 4 Ohio Rep. 386.

SHERIFF.

1. A sheriff sells land on execution to one who refuses to pay the money. Held that the sheriff is not bound to make himself liable by returning an actual sale. Bisbee's Lessee v. Hall, 3 Ohio Rep. 464.

2. Before the act of February, 1824, where a sheriff in office levied upon lands, a sale by the same individual, upon a vendi issued to him, when out of office was valid. Fowble v. Rayberg, 4 Ohio Rep. 55.

3. Sale of land having been made by former sheriff, the deed must be made by the sheriff in office, at the time of executing it. lb.

SHIPS, &c.

1. A master of a ship has a lien upon the freight for port fees, repairs, supplies, and other necessary expenses incurred in a foreign port; and payment thereof to the ship owner does not discharge such lien, after notice to the consignee. Van Bokkelin v. Ingersoll, 5 Wend. 315.

2. The master has no lien on the freight for his wages. lb.

3. In this case it was also held that the sentence of a court of admiralty adjudging the vessel and freight to the owner, could not be urged by way of estoppel against the master, by the defendant in this cause; the latter not having been a party to the proceedings in that court, and consequently not bound by its sentence. SLANDER.

16.

Slander will lie for the speaking of words imputing insolvency to any one to whom credit is important in the prosecution of his business thus to say, of a distiller, 'there is a time when men will fail, who must fail, and Ostrom's time has come,' was holden to be actionable. Ostrom v. Calkins, 5 Wend. 263. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

1. Excess of price over the value, if the contract be free from imposition, is not of itself a sufficient objection to a decree for a specific performance, but when connected with others, it may induce the court to refuse such a decree. Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 265.

2. Where, therefore, a contract with a penalty for its non-performance was executed by the defendant, under the supposition, that • on the payment of the penalty he could be released from the contract which supposition was known to and countenanced by the plaintiff, and there also appeared to be a great difference between the price and value of the land, the court refused to decree a specific performance. lb.

See AGREEMENT.

STATUTES.

1. The only effect of the revised statutes upon offences committed previous to those statutes going into operation, is, that the proceedings in prosecutions for such offences must be conducted according to the provisions of those statutes; if the punishment for such offences is mitigated by those statutes, such mitigated punishment only can be applied. The People v. Phelps, 5 Wend. 10.

2. A statute authorizing an heir to come in and prosecute a real action commenced by his ancestor, is not retrospective when applied to a case where the action was commenced before, and the ancestor died after, the passing of the statute. Holyoke v. Haskins, 9 Pick. 259.

See CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

STATE, Suits against a.

1. In a suit against a state, a service of the process of the court upon the Governor and Attorney-General of the state, sixty

days before the return of the process, is a sufficient service. New Jersey v. New York, 5 Pet. 285.

2. After a due service, the state which is complainant has a right to proceed ex parte. lb.

SURETIES.

1. Sureties to the United States may be exonerated, it would seem, from their liability, by gross neglect on the part of the government to settle the accounts of the principal. Smith v. United States, 5 Pet. 299.

2. Where in an action by the United States against the surety of

a paymaster in the army, the defendant pleaded that his principal was removed from office on the first of April 1815, and on the fifteenth of September ensuing, reported himself to the Treasurer of the United States, as ready for the settlement of his accounts, at which time and long afterwards, he was solvent and able to pay the full amount of his defalcation; that no notice was given to him by the Treasury to account for the money in his hands, and that no notice was given to the defendant till about December 1824, before which time his principal had become insolvent ; to which plea there was a demurrer. Held by a majority of the court that the plea was insufficient, and the demurrer was sustained. Ib.

See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

SUPREME COURT.

This court has power to issue a mandamus to a Circuit Court of the United States, commanding the court to sign a bill of exceptions, in a case tried before such court. Ex parte Crane, 5

Pet. 191. Baldwin dissenting.

TAX.

The law taxing the capital of merchants is constitutional. Raguet v. Wade, 4 Ohio Rep. 107.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

TRESPASS.

A party who turns out property and directs it to be taken by a constable, cannot, in an action against him and the constable for taking the property, set up the defence, that he acted in aid. or assistance, or by command of the constable; to entitle a party to such defence, there should be a request from the officer, or it should appear that aid or assistance was necessary, from which a request might be implied. Merrill v. Near, 5 Wend. 237. 2. Where a party enters a house by license, he will not be considered a trespasser ab initio by reason of an unlawful act done after such entry; so held where a party entered the house of

another in his absence and obtained papers from his wife, of which he took copies for the purpose of commencing a suit against her husband. Allen v. Crofoot, 5 Wend. 506.

3. Trespass cannot be maintained by the owner of land, held by a tenant in actual possession, paying part of the produce as rent. Miller v. Fulton, 4 Ohio Rep. 434.

4. In trespass de bonis asportatis the defendant may prove in mitigation of damages, that the goods did not belong to the plaintiff and that they came to the use of the owner, although in taking them the defendant acted without any authority. Squire v. Hollenbeck, 9 Pick. 551.

5. If in trespass against two, the defendants plead severally, and several damages are assessed by the jury, the plaintiff may take judgment against both de melioribus damnis. Halsey v. Woodruff, 9 Pick. 555.

See JUDGE.

TRUST.

1. Where a debtor, before judgment, agrees to convey land in payment of his debt to a favored creditor, and executes a defective conveyance, and the land is subsequently sold upon execution, the purchaser by contract has an equity superior to that of the purchaser on execution, and a court of equity will compel the purchaser under the judgment to convey the legal title. Barr v. Hatch, 3 Ohio Rep. 538.

2. Devise of 50,000 dollars to executors, 'in trust to loan the same upon ample and sufficient security, or to invest the same in safe and productive stock, either in the public funds, bank shares or other stock, according to their best judgment, and to pay over the profits and income thereof to the testator's wife during the term of her natural life,' and after her decease to deliver one half in actual value of the entire fund to a college, for the foundation of a professorship, and the other half to a hospital. Held, that the trustees were authorized to make investments in stocks of an incorporated manufacturing company, and of an incorporated insurance company. Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446.

3. An insurance company, in whose stock the trustees invested part of the fund, made a dividend of money received by virtue of a treaty with a foreign government, for claims existing at the time of the investment, for illegal captures of property insured by the company. It was held, that the money so received was not a part of the capital stock of the insurance company, and