5. In an action against several on such judgment, who sever in their defence, if the plea of one be adjudged good, and the judgment as to him be pronounced void, it is void as to all the defendants. Ib. 6. A lien on land is not discharged as against a subsequent purchaser by a levy on chattels released by mutual consent. Ford v. Skinner, 4 Ohio Rep. 383. See SATISFACTION. JURISDICTION of the D. C. of U. S. The District Court of the United States for Alabama has no juris- 1. Is the ordinance of 1787, for the government of the Northwest territory, to be considered an act of Congress within the 25th section of the Judiciary act, so as to give jurisdiction to this court? Quære. Mernard v. Aspasia, 5 Pet. 515. 2. The general provisions as to the rights of property contained in it, cannot give such jurisdiction. Ib. 3. The title of the party must arise under the act of Congress; it is not enough that a right previously existing is not taken away by such act, to give jurisdiction within the 25th section. 1b. 4. The court will not take jurisdiction, under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, unless the case, as stated in the record, is brought within the provisions of that section. Fisher v. Cockerell, 5 Pet. 256. 5. In cases at common law, no paper will be considered by the court as a part of the record, unless it is made so by the pleadings, or by some opinion of the court, referring to it. Ib. 6. Thus where the plaintiff obtained judgment in an action of ejectment in the Union Court in Kentucky, on which hab. fac. possessionem was awarded, and afterwards on motion of the defendant commissioners were appointed to assess the value of the improvements according to the law of that state, who reported, and judgment was given against the plaintiff for the amount so reported, and afterwards the plaintiff moved to have the proceedings of the commissioners quashed, which being refused, he excepted and appealed to the court of appeals of that state, and among the errors assigned by the plaintiff on such appeal was the following, The plaintiff deriving title from Virginia, the act or acts of the State of Kentucky, on which this court has founded its opinion, is repugnant, as to the compact with Virginia, therefore void as to this case, being against the constitution of the United States,' and on the hearing of the appeal the judgment of the Union Court of Kentucky was affirmed — which judgment is brought before this court by writ of error. The clerk of the court in Kentucky certified that certain documents were read at the trial, and among them is the patent, on which the plaintiff relies to show he claimed title from Virginia. Held that this court cannot take jurisdiction in this case, it not appearing on the record that he claimed title to the land from Virginia. The certificate of the clerk, that the patent was used at the trial, does not make it a part of the record. lb. Baldwin J. dissenting. 7. The patent ought to have been made expressly the foundation of his motion to quash the proceedings of the commissioners in the court below, and thus a title derived from Virginia would have been spread upon the record. lb. See ADMIRALTY. JURY. 1. A juror having said, upon the voir dire, that from what he had read in the newspapers, his prejudices were against the prisoner, but that he had no definite opinion, and that he should be governed by the evidence, the prisoner was allowed to challenge him for cause. Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 496. 2. A juror having said, on the voir dire, that he had formed an opinion from what he had heard, was asked if he had formed such an opinion as incapacitated him from giving an impartial verdict; he replied, that he did not know how much he might be influenced by his preconceived opinion. This was allowed as a cause for challenge. Ib. 3. On a trial for murder, the jury, upon their own request, seconded by the wish of the counsel on both sides and the consent of the prisoner, were permitted to view the place where the murder was committed, and to take with them plans which had been exhibited and explained in court, but no person was allowed to speak to them while taking the view. lb. LAKES. See RIVERS, 2. LANDLORD AND TENANT. 1. The purchase by a tenant of an adverse title, or a disclaimer of his tenure in any other way, makes his possession adverse so far that he may obtain a title by adverse possession if he remains during the term prescribed by the statute of limitations, but no farther. He cannot contest his landlord's title to possession, or defend himself by any claim or title adverse to his landlord, during the time the statute has to run. Peyton v. Stith, 5 Pet. 493. 2. Before he can set up such title he must be out of possession, unless it is legalized by time. lb. 3. This applies in equity as well as at law. 1b. LAND TITLES. See SEIZIN. LAW AND FACT. 1. Ignorance of the law signifies ignorance of the law of one's own country. Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. 112. 2. Ignorance of the law of a foreign government is ignorance of fact. Ib. 3. In this respect the laws of other states in the Union are foreign laws. Ib. LEASE. The assignee of a lessor of a term for years may maintain an action of debt for the rent against the assignee of the lessee. Howland v. Coffin, 9 Pick. 52. LETTER OF CREDIT. 1. When a merchant acts upon the faith of a letter of credit, if he would hold the writer of such letter responsible upon it, he must give him notice of his having so acted. Edmonston v. Drake, 5 Pet. 637. 2. Where a person has become responsible to a third person for the performance by another of a particular contract, any material alteration in such contract, without his consent, will release him from his responsibility. Ib. 3. A change in the mode or place of payment, if made without his consent, would discharge him. 1b. 4. Mr. Robson, of Charleston, being about to proceed to the Havana for the purpose of making a speculation in coffee, Mr. Edmonston gave him the following letter of credit, addressed to Messrs. Castillo and Black of that place: 'The present is intended as a letter of credit in favor of J. & T. Robson, to the amount of 40 or $50,000, which sum they may wish to invest through you in the purchase of the produce of your island. Whatever engagements they may enter into, will be punctually attended to.' On Mr. Robson's arrival there, the house to whom the letter was addressed, being unable to attend to the business, introduced him to Messrs. D & M, who on the faith of the letter, which was shown to them, made a contract with Mr. Robson for the shipment of a large quantity of coffee, and it was agreed that they should draw on New York for their reimbursement; of all which they advised Mr. Edmonston, who approved it. Messrs. D & M accordingly made the ship ments and drew bills upon New York for a part of the shipments, which were paid; but in consequence of some change in the rate of exchange, they drew on London for the balance, of which they immediately advised the Messrs. Robson, who approved of the change. No notice of this however was given to Mr. Edmonston; the bills on London were not paid. Held that Mr. Edmonston was not liable. lb. 5. A general letter of credit creates no obligation in favor of persons to whom such letter was never shown. McClung v. Means, 4 Ohio Rep. 197. LIEN. See SEAMAN'S WAGES; SHIPS. LIMITATIONS, Statute of. 1. The statute of limitations is no bar to a recovery in an action of assumpsit by an executor, although more than six years have elapsed after the cause of action accrued before suit brought, if it be shown that a suit for the same cause of action was prosecuted by the testator within six years after the accruing of the same, and that such suit abated by the death of the testator. Schermerhorn v. Schermerhorn, 5 Wend. 513. 2. The running of the statute of limitation, is interrupted by the parties submitting a question of boundary to arbitration. Hunt v. Guilford, 4 Ohio Rep. 310. 3. The statute of limitations begins to run when the injurious act complained of is committed, though the injury is subsequent and consequential. Kerns v. Schoonmaker, 4 Ohio Rep. 332. 4. The limitation act of the state of Kentucky, known by the name of the seven years law, is not a violation of the seventh article of the compact between Kentucky and Virginia, which declares all private rights and interests of lands within the said district of Kentucky, derived from the laws of Virginia, prior to the separation, shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the proposed state, and shall be determined by the laws now existing in this state (Virginia).' Hawkins v. Barney, 5 Pet. 457. 5. Any course of legislation by Kentucky, sanctioned by the principles and practice of Virginia, is to be regarded as a compliance with such compact. Ib. 6. A statute of limitations may be set up in defence in equity, as well as at law. Lewis v. Marshall, 5 Pet. 471. 7. The statute of limitation of Kentucky, under which adverse possession may be set up, prescribes the limitation of twenty years, within which suit must be brought, but provides, 'that if any person or persons entitled to such writ or writs, or title of entry, shall be or were under the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or not within the commonwealth at the time such right accrued or came to them, every such person, his or her heirs, shall and may, notwithstanding the said twenty years are or shall be expired, bring or maintain his action, or make his entry within ten years, next after such disabilities removed, or death of the person so disabled, and not afterwards.' Held under this provision, that if land descended to an heir, before a cause of action had accrued by an adverse possession, the statute would not operate as to him until he came within the statute. That if a cause of action accrued by such a possession during the life time of the ancestor, the heir would be limited to ten years from the death of his ancestor for the assertion of his claim. lb. 8. In the case of a joint and several note made by two promisors, a partial payment made within six years by the administrator of one of them, will not take the note out of the statute of limitations as against the surviving promisor. Hathaway v. Haskell, 9 Pick. 42. 9. Actual fraud discovered (or which the plaintiff had the means of discovering) more than six years before the commencement of a bill in equity, will not take the case out of the statute of limitations. lb. 10. The statute of limitations begins to run from the date of a promissory note payable in money on demand. Little v. Blunt, 9 Pick. 488. 11. But where an action will not lie without a previous demand, as on a promise to deliver goods or perform some service on demand, the statute begins to run from the time of making the demand. lb. 12. A new promise made to the holder of a note, will enure to the benefit of a subsequent endorsee. Ib. LOCAL LAW. Court of a state, to a such state, as a rule of The construction, given by the Supreme will devising real property situated in property, is binding in the courts of the United States. Henderson and wife v. Griffin, 5 Pet. 154. MANDAMUS. It is a sufficient return to a mandamus to sign a bill of exceptions, that the facts are not truly set forth. State of Ohio v. Todd, 4 Ohio Rep. 351. See SUPREME COURT. |