thinking of the former U.S. citizen who lost citizenship. They wer concerned solely with veterans.

However, in the various bills that were under consideration an in the conferences, an earlier bill did refer in sections 327 and 32 to veterans. But, in other bills, 327 did not relate to veterans. related at one time to women who had lost citizenship.

So, there was a transposition. There was an error in inserting i section 318, sections 327 and 328 when what was meant was section 328 and 329. So, as the law now reads, literally, this man will b penalized if a deportation order is entered against him.

Now, we have to some degree tried to alleviate that situation, an we have a case now pending before the U.S. District Court in Sa Francisco urging the court, at least in the type of case in which th serviceman is deportable because he was an immigrant at the time o the entry and had no visa, to declare section 318 inapplicable becaus he is being penalized on a ground from which he is exempted unde section 329 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

So, there is an inconsistency, and we are urging the court to hol that the section 329 veteran applying for naturalization who is unde an order of deportation which is based upon a no-visa charge is never theless not debarred from naturalization by virtue of section 318.

Mr. RODINO. You are urging that, but presently the constructio or interpretation would be that a deportable alien wouldn't be eligibl for naturalization?

Mr. RUDNICK. Correct.

Mr. RODINO. What would be the effect of a dishonorable discharg given to a serviceman who had been naturalized under this legislation Mr. RUDNICK. There is a safeguard in the existing law which thi amendment would not affect, and that is that if a serviceman receives discharge other than honorable, the ordinary revocation proceeding under section 340 may be invoked to revoke his citizenship on tha basis.

I might say that that is a discretionary matter on the part of th court. It doesn't use mandatory language-it uses "may." Som courts have in some instances held they would not enter an order o cancellation even though there was technical grounds for doing so Mr. RODINO. When would the serviceman first be eligible or qualifie to petition the courts for naturalization? Would it be immediatel upon his entry into the service, the first day of his entry into th service

Mr. RUDNICK (interposing). Following such a cancellation? Mr. RODINO. No. I am talking about the serviceman who is eligi ble; not about any preconditions.

Mr. RUDNICK. There are no times or periods prescribed.

Mr. RODINO. He is an alien serviceman and inducted or enlistedMr. RUDNICK. (interposing). Active duty gives him the benefits Mr. RODINO. Active duty?

Mr. RUDNICK. Yes.

Mr. RODINO. You don't make any distinction, or no distinction i suggested between the enlisted serviceman alien or the volunteer? Mr. RUDNICK. No.

Mr. RODINO. Or the draftee, let's say.

Mr. RUDNICK. No. Public Law 86, the 1953 legislation, required 90 days service. That is for Koreans.

Mr. RODINO. Right.

Mr. RUDNICK. I might also say that the 1953 legislation apparently recognized the difficulty experienced by the deportable alien because in that legislation they excepted 318 as applicable to the Korean veteran, but when it became part of our permanent legislation, that was not carried over.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Rudnick, you talk about three basic matters affecting the form which the amendments should take which you feel the committee should seriously consider when you talk about the fixing of an appropriate date, and yet, you have no suggestion or you make no recommendation but defer to the Department of State and Department of Defense as to the time?

Mr. RUDNICK. Yes, sir.

Mr. RODINO. But any date

Mr. RUDNICK (interposing). Any date would be agreeable, certainly.

Mr. RODINO. There is no objection to any of the dates?

Mr. RUDNICK. No.

Mr. RODINO. And, No. 2, you talk about the selection of a terminal date. Wouldn't it be difficult under present conditions-hopefully, we would like to see this conflict end quickly, so that we might be able to set a terminal date-but don't you think that that would be rather difficult for this committee to wrestle with and set a terminal date? Mr. RUDNICK. Mr. Rodino, that could be done without setting a date if it would trigger-if a formula for triggering an end-for example, a statement by the President or Congress that hostilities or the conflict had ceased, that would cut it.

Mr. RODINO. That is your alternative suggestion?

Mr. RUDNICK. Yes. That would be the other method without setting a fixed date. Although, again, in the 1953 legislation, relating to Korea, they set a 1955 date ahead. I don't think that that is necessary, but I think it would be desirable so that it would be unnecessary to have the committee again make a determination as to when to cut it off and have legislation passed, whereas, this would be an automatic method of accomplishing the purpose.

Mr. RODINO. My question was merely directed to the setting of that terminal date.

Mr. RUDNICK. That would be difficult.

Mr. RODINO. I think your alternate suggestion is better. Thank you very much.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Your alternative to a fixed date, Mr. Rudnick, would then be a termination date as of a declaration or proclamation by the President?

Mr. RUDNICK. Yes. So there would be no need for further legislation to terminate these benefits.

Mr. FEIGHAN. How can we be assured the President would be making such a declaration or proclamation?

Mr. RUDNICK. There is no assurance of that.

Mr. FEIGHAN. What other alternative would there be, in other words, to set forth the date which will arrive contingent upon certain other events?

Mr. RUDNICK. If the President or the Congress issues such a statement or declaration, of course, it would still require additional legislation to terminate this, and, as Mr. Rodino points out, it is extremely

difficult to fix a calendar date at this point. If, however, the President did not issue a declaration, of course, it would be necessary to pass some legislation to put an end to these benefits.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I just wondered if you had in mind some specific formula that we could incorporate?

Mr. RUDNICK. No, nothing, other than a declaration of termination of hostilities.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you, Mr. Rudnick.

Mr. Dowdy?

Mr. Downy. I have been trying follow this. I wasn't on the committee last year when this was under consideration, and it is new to me. We are talking about combat service here, as I take it. I am wondering why a bill couldn't be written just as at least just as definite as we are talking about a termination here that would apply in any event where men-where our servicemen are sent into combat service, whether it is in Vietnam or some other place, because the way things go, it is quite possible that by the time or after the Vietnam situation is over, we will be involved somewhere else.

Why would it be necessary for us to come back here and make special legislation for every one of these-I guess you call them nonwars we find ourselves fighting?

Mr. RUDNICK. Well, except that 329 and all of the predecessor acts just took up the situation as it happened in our history and had the same problem, I assume, as we are having now, where do we start and where do we end, to see whether or not it would be equitable to incorporate and include within the benefits members of the Armed Forces who perhaps served at a date that appeared to be a little too early for benefits as broad as these.

Mr. Dowdy. I don't know that it would be hard to determine when we have men in combat, whether you call it war or something else. Do I understand that there is some provision in the present law where an alien enlists or is inducted into the service that if he serves a certain limit of time, whether we are in a fight or not, that he has special-some special privileges?

Mr. RUDNICK. Yes, under any circumstances, service for 3 years. Mr. Dowdy. Three years?

Mr. RUDNICK. Three years.

Mr. Dowdy. A man in that circumstance, where he served 3 years, he is an alien, and enlisted in the U.S. Army, is it necessary that he should have been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence?

Mr. RUDNICK. Yes.

Mr. Dowdy. Or at the time of the enlistment he was in the United States.

Mr. RUDNICK. That is not sufficient for him.

Mr. DOWDY. That is not sufficient?

Mr. RUDNICK. No.

Mr. Dowdy. Do you know the reason for that, or was there a reason? Mr. RUDNICK. Here, too, I am not quite certain that this was done intentionally in passing this Act. The 1940 Nationality Act contained identical provisions, almost identical with what is now in the peacetime provisions of the current Act, section 328.

One of the exceptions under the 1940 Act was from a certificate of arrival-a certificate of arrival was required in the case of a civilian to establish a lawful admission for permanent residence.

This peacetime veteran or serviceman was exempted from a certificate of arrival under the 1940 Act. That was interpreted as meaning he was exempted from a lawful admission for permanent residence, otherwise the exemption from a certificate of arrival would have no significance.

When the Immigration and Nationality Act came into existence a certificate of arrival had disappeared from the law, and it was no longer being used. There is no reference to it in the current Act. It wasn't necessary therefore in reenacting into the current legislation the provisions of the 1940 Act to mention an exemption from a certificate of arrival. It was nonexistent.

However, in doing so, the Congress did not go on and use a substitute for it and did not provide that a person who has 3 years of military service need not have a lawful admission for permanent residence. It was overlooked.

By dropping the certificate of arrival, they, in effect, restored the requirement of lawful admission for permanent residence. That is how it happens to be in the law today.

Up until then, this man was exempt from that requirement; now he

is not.

Mr. DOWDY. Do you know-maybe you don't-do we have any, or is there any way that a citizen of Mexico or Switzerland, living in those countries, either one of those countries, or any other country-just take those out of the air-could enlist in the U.S. Army?

Mr. RUDNICK. I don't believe we have it any more. We had these Lodge Act enlistees who are eligible for the benefits of the section we are discussing now, 329, even though they didn't serve during relevant periods mentioned in the section. These are overseas enlisted alien military men, and we have a provision in the current law that allows them to be naturalized.

I think that program has terminated.

Mr. DowDY. They would have to be lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence?

Mr. RUDNICK. No, sir. They were enlisted for 5 years, and when they enter the United States during their military service, and at the expiration of 5 years, the law regards them as having been lawfully admitted for permanent residence for the purposes of section 329. Mr. Downy. That is no longer the law?

Mr. RUDNICK. That is still the law, except I do not believe that the military is enlisting these men into the Army overseas as they have in the past. We still have people who served under that program and who from time to time apply for citizenship under section 329, basing their lawful admission on 5 years of military service.

Mr. Downy. That might be. It seems to me it might be a good thing to have in the law at the present. I was curious about that. I know we can't draft and induct citizens of another country who are not in the United States.

You think that any law or bill we pass or enact should apply to members that are in service, whether they serve in combat zones or not?

Mr. RUDNICK. Yes, sir, that is our position.

Mr. DOWDY. You wouldn't require them to have, I believe, the present 3 years of service?

Mr. RUDNICK. That is correct, sir.

Mr. DOWDY. I believe that is all.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you. We are very grateful to you, Mr. Rudnick.

Our next witness will be Capt. E. R. Fickenscher of the Department of the Navy. We are very happy to have you with us, Captain.

Am I correct in understanding that you have with you Commander Jek and Dr. Watson, Department of the Navy, Internal Law Division? Captain FICKENSCHER. Yes, sir.

Chairman FEIGHAN. Welcome, Dr. Watson, Commander Jek.

Captain FICKENSCHER. I also have present, sir, Lieutenant Colonel Conderberg from the Army, and Colonel Barry from the Air Force, and also Captain Burke from the Coast Guard, if you have any questions in those areas.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Welcome to all you gentlemen.

STATEMENT OF CAPT. E. R. FICKENSCHER, U.S. NAVY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT CHIEF FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

Captain FICKENSCHER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Capt. E. R. Fickenscher, U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief for Plans and Programs, Bureau of Naval Personnel.

I have the honor to appear before this committee in behalf of the Department of Defense in connection with the committee's consideration of the several bills to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for the naturalization of persons through active-duty service in the Armed Forces of the United States.

The Immigration and Nationality Act as amended already provides for certain exemptions from the normal process of naturalization for members of the Armed Forces of the United States who served on active duty during the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, or the Korean hostilities.

The bills under consideration would, in general, add to these periods the period of Vietnam combat activities. We believe that the same policy considerations which were applicable in World Wars I and II and in Korea are also applicable in the present situation.

Although each of these bills in general provides for exemptions to the naturalization process for Vietnam service, there are minor differences. H.R. 565 and H.R. 2903 provide for these exemptions beginning February 28, 1961.

H.R. 1, H.R. 40, H.R. 763, and H.R. 2560 all provide the same exemptions but beginning January 1, 1963. H.R. 3914 provides the exemption beginning January 1, 1964, but limits the exemption geographically to those having served in the actual combat zone.

As indicated last year in our report on H.R. 15432 before the 89th Congress, the Department of Defense considered February 28, 1961, the date most appropriate since it coincides in general with the initial authorization on January 31, 1961, for assignment of U.S. advisers to Republic of Vietnam Army battalions, and the follow-on authorization for these advisers to accompany battalion and company sized units on combat operations.